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In 1988 a single television camnercial might well have determined who 
was to become the 41st President of the United states. 
Broadcast during network primetime, the advertisement showed a long line 
of zombie-like prisoners marching through a gate of bars. As it opened, the 
gate became a revolving door. The rrenacing prisoners marched out. 
An ominous-sounding narrator is heard; the voice intones that Democratic 
candidate Michael Dukakis' policy was to allow weekend passes to first-degree 
murderers--even though they were not eligible for parole, and even though many 
had escaped while on furlough. The commercial's rressage was clear: a vote for 
Dukakis rreant a vote for turning loose murderers and rapists onto the streets. 
The highly effective ''Revolving IXlor" ad was the VXJrk of the campaign 
of Republican George Bush. It was reminiscent of a commercial Lyndon Johnson 
ran in 1964, which showed a little girl plucking daisy petals while a countdown 
is heard in the background. Suddenly, the muShrOClITl cloud of a nuclear explosion 
is seen. The ad powerfully implied that Johnson's opponent, Barry Cbldwater, 
would start World War III. (Harrigan, 159) 
Just as the "Daisy" ad created an unfavorable impression of Cbldwater, 
"Revolving IXlor" and a few other Bush spots were successful in defining Dukakis 
unfavorably in the minds of the electorate. Dukakis' corrmercials, rreanwhile, 
were less effective in defining Bush unfavorably. 
Significantly, in both campaigns, the goal was not to present the candidate 
positively, but to portray the opponent negatively. Both Bush and Dukakis used 
this same strategy to defeat their opponents in the primary elections. The 
most effective vehicle for this plan of attack was the television commercial. 
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This thesis will show that negative political television advertisements 
played an essential role in the 1988 presidential election. "Negative ads" 
allowed Bush and Dukakis to win the nominations of their respective parties. 
And Bush's superior negative commercials allowed him to defeat Dukakis in the 
general election. This is demonstrable through surveys and electoral results. 
The concept of "negative campaigning" is not just using invective to 
discredit a political opponent. It is, as will be seen, a stage in the 
advertising process. Negative advertisements persuade through strong emotional 
appeals and a careful manipulation of selected facts. The motive is not to 
cause the candidate broadcasting the ad to win, but to cause the opponent to 
lose. 
Political advertising on television dates back to the Eisenhower-stevenson 
race of 1952. Since then, the short (30- or 60-second) political commercial 
has developed both distinct rhetorical models and visual styles. It has grawn 
to dominate American political campaigns, especially preSidential elections. 
(Diamond, 1984, xi) 
The Eisenhower-Stevenson campaign first raised the major, 
disturbing-and continuing--questions about politics, 
advertising, and television. Should presidential campaigns 
be run by marketing prinCiples and Madison Avenue ad men? 
Do 30-second commercials ignore issues and content in favor 
of image and emotion? Does the best man win, or the most 
telegenic performer? Can money buy enough media to buy 
elections? Every four years since 1952, these questions have 
reappeared, and each campaign since has provided enough 
contradictory answers to keei? them alive and unresolved. 
(Diamond, 1984, 65) 
Diamond (1984) identified the four key rhetorical stages of political 
advertising during campaigns: 
1) ID: The candidate must identify himself to the voter, give some 
biographical information, and associate himself with same symbolic issue. 
2) Argument: After name recognition is established, a candidate must tell 
3 
viewers what his ideas are and what he stands for. Popular, "hot issues" are 
the subj ects of these ads. 
3) Attack: Once the candidate's name, history and sanething of his 
personality and ideas are known, the campaign enters its third phase, negative 
advertising. Name-calling, direct personal attacks and symbolic attacks are 
often used to discredit the opponent. Usually delivered by the candidate in 
the early years of TV spots, attack ads now are IIDst often delivered by 
surrogate speakers. Attack ads enjoyed an unprecedented role in the 1988 
campaign. 
4)Resolution: In the final few days of the campaign, last-minute positive 
appeals are used to make the candidate look dignified and to overcome the 
strident negativism of the attack stage. (Diamond, 1984, 326-327) 
The television advertising of the attack stage drew a great deal of 
attention in 1 988. But as in previous election years, "going negative meant 
doing unto your opponent before he could do unto you." (Will, 1987, 188) 
Candidates offer three elementary excuses for using negative advertising 
tactics, according to conservative columnist George Will: "The other guy started 
it;" "I'm not being negative, I'm just alerting the electorate to my loathsome 
opponent's squalid record;" and "Negative campaigning is as American as apple 
pie--and, by the way, did I mention that my opponent hates apple pie." (Will, 
1987, 188) 
But wouldn't such a tactic backfire? Surely intelligent people, regardless 
of their political affiliations, would recognize such tactics and wouldn't 
fall for such an appeal. But according to Will, negative advertising sometimes 
succeeds, because "people tend to confuse rudeness with sincerity and to equate 
sincerity with high principle." (Will 190) 
Television has revolutionized political advertising and made negative 
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spots the ad tactic of choice. IlToday voters do not venture out to experience 
negativism at torchlight rallies. Today negativism comes to voters in their 
living rooms. 1I (Will, 1987, 188) 
But television commercials are very expensive, and a candidate running 
for national office can have difficulty paying for network ad time. Yet serious 
contenders always manages to pay for their spots. They can afford expensive 
time slots if their campaigns are bankrolled by two principal sources: federal 
campaign subsidies and political action committees, or PACs. 
The federal financing of the nomination campaigns works this way: A 
candidate qualifies for federal matching money by raising at least $5,000 in 
amounts of $250 or less in each of 20 states, starting one year before the 
election. Once that requirement is met, the federal government matches every 
contribution up to $250 the candidate received during the prenomination period. 
(Germond, 53) After the conventions, the federal public financing system 
provides each nominee with $46 million for the general election. And the parties 
can raise unlimited amounts--called IIsoft moneyll_-to benefit a presidential 
ticket. (Germond, 417) Of the $29 million in federally allotted campaign funds 
that Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter each spent in 1980, almost half went into 
paid political advertising, mainly on TV. (Diamond, 1984, xii) 
By contributing to a candidate whose views they support, PACs can have 
a noticeable impact upon political debate. During the primary season, PACs 
are limited by law to $5,000 donations to any candidate, but after the 
conventions, they can spend millions on their own television advertising 
supporting a candidate. (Devlin, 391) 
The gusher of political money has made the negativism 
more audible. • • • Candidates have always said beastly 
things about one another in speeches and union halls 
or lodge meetings, but now that there is so much cash 
sloshing around in the system, candidates can afford 
to broadcast their attacks. (Will, 1987, 189) 
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After the vicious 1986 elections, Will wrote "what is new is not 
just the amount of negativism, it is the niggling tendentiousness of it. 
What is tiresome is the reckless use of a candidate's votes to characterize 
the candidate." Will explains: "A vote for less-than-maximum funding for 
a program for the handicapped or against the most stringent sanctions 
against South Africa becomes grounds for 30 seconds of rubbish about the 
candidate 'voting against the handicapped' or 'supporting apartheid. "' 
Taken out of context, almost anything from a candidate's background can 
be used against him by an opponent. (Will, 1987, 190) 
Although negative ads were used widely in the 1988 campaign, they 
weren't broadcast in earnest until after the January Iowa caucuses. In 
the months preceeding this first contest, all the candidates' ads followed 
Diamond's initial stages: identification of the candidate, then arguments 
for his ideas. The field of presidential hopefuls all spent a great deal 
of money on this farm state, hoping a big win early on would propel them 
to the nomination. 
In the caucuses, two midwesterners prevailed. Kansas Sen. Bob Dole 
easily won over the other Republicans. Surprisingly, Vice President George 
Bush finished third behind televangelist Pat Robertson. Among the 
Democrats, Missouri Rep. Richard Gephardt was the top finisher. 
Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis, an obscure figure at that time, placed 
third after Illinois Sen. Paul Simon. Jesse Jackson and the other Democrats 
were far behind. 
One week later, in New Hampshire, the advertising of the Republican 
campaigns would shift into the third stage--attack. A strong Reagan ally, 
Dole had to find a way to attack the vice president personally without 
appearing to criticize the president. Bush had a long resume/of Washington 
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jobs, but Dole believed he could jab him for his persistently low profile. 
In the week before the New Hampshire primary, Dole ran two negative 
ads to convey this message. "In homage to the comic strip that inspired 
it, 'Doonesbury' featured George Bush's image fading into invisibility, 
with a voice-over questioning what it was he had done in all those 
impressive jobs." (Mathews, 94) Meanwhile, "Footprints" showed boots 
crossing heavy snow on the ground--without leaving any trace of footprints. 
The ad made the argument that George Bush had not left his mark on any 
of his top-level jobs. (Germond, 140) 
A Dole victory over Bush in New Hampshire would have likely knocked 
the vice president out of contention. But Bush had on his side advertising 
czar Roger Ailes, who had done corrmerci3.ls for Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford 
and Ronald Reagan, and consultant Lee ŶŘŞGŊŠWĦĜŸŲHĚ GĦJJÙŸŲŨĴŊWXĚ ;'Uxector of Reagan's 
re-election campaign. 
Ailes and Atwater insisted Bush do negative ad5. ĨĒŨŸVUĚwas hesitant, 
but they convinced him that attack spots were a necessity if the vice 
president's campaign was to survive. An ad called "Straddle" was produced 
just two days before the primary. Not only was it a turning point for 
Bush, "Straddle" was also an archetype for ads during the rest of the 
campaign. The teleplay was simple, but direct: 
VIDED 
Pictures of Bush and Dole. 
Bush alone, with caption: 
"Led Fight for INFII 
Two pictures of Dole, 
facing each other, with 
the caption: "Straddled." 
AUDIO 
Voice-over announcer: 
"George Bush and Bob Dole on 
leadership. 
"George Bush led the fight 
on the INF treaty for Ronald 
Reagan. 
"Bob Dole straddled until Iowans 
pushed him into supporting 
INF. 
Cut back to Bush picture. 
caption: "Against Oil 
ImpJrt Tax. II 
Cut back to two Ibles. 
caption: "Straddled" 
Bush picture, captioned 
"Won lt Raise Taxes" 
"George Bush is against an 
oil import tax. 
"Bob Ible straddled, but now 
says hels for an oil impJrt 
fee. 
"George Bush says he wonlt 
raise taxes, period. 
IlBob Ible straddles, and he 
just wonlt promise not to raise 
taxes. And you know what that 
Two faces of Ible. 
"Straddled,1I dissolves 
to "Taxes--He canlt 
Say No. 1I means. 
(Germond, 141) 
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IIStraddle ll was sent to TV stations the day before the primary and played 
constantly. The ad painted Ible as a IIcloset revenuer, II and its late-hit timing 
left him no time to get out an effective answer. (Mathews, 94) 
The New Hampshire results restored Bush as a serious contender for the 
nomination. He received 38 percent of the vote, ten points ahead of Ible, and 
buried Robertson, Jack Kemp and Pete DuPont. (Mathews, 94) 
According to Germond (141), 
"Straddle" was a classic case of selzlng an opening and, with 
just the right amount of distortion, exploiting it. The notion 
that Bush "1ed the fight ll for the intermediate-range missile treaty 
was ludicrous, as was the idea that Ible had been "pushed into" 
supporting the INF ratification. In his role as the Senate 
Republican leader, Ible had felt justifiably constrained not to 
endorse the treaty until it had been reviewed by his colleagues, 
some of whom had serious doubts about it •••• But there was 
never any question of Ible I s support for the treaty, and the claim 
that he had IIStraddled" was farfetched. But the key element of 
the ad was the charge on taxes, and here Ible had left himself 
vulnerable because he had not • • • inoculated himself (against 
the charge). The truth was that Ible was not willing to "take 
the pledge" on all taxes at any time, which is what New Hampshire 
seemed to require. But the pledge on income taxes alone might 
have given him some protection from the charge of staddling. 
Meanwhile, in the Democratic ranks, Dukakis, Gephardt, Jackson and the 
other Democrats were still attempting, through commercials, to identify 
themselves to voters and make known their individual themes. Dukakis rebounded 
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and won in New Hampshire, and he and Gephardt emerged as the front-runners. 
The first strong use of negative ads among the Democratic candidates 
was seen in the South Dakota primary. Gephardt stymied Dukakis with a negative 
spot titled "Belgian Endive," that was similar to Bush' s ĒŐWŲŠTTĦŨŤŸÍȚĚThe ad 
"highlighted how out of touch a liberal, northeastern governor is with the 
cOl11llOn people of the farm states." (Payne, 374) 
VIDED 
Photos of Gephardt and Dukakis 
wi th caption "Compare Two 
Candidates. " 
Gephardt photo shows him walking 
with union workers. caption: 
"Trade Bill to Save Jobs." Under 
Gephardt photo, "Yes;" under Du-
kakis, "No." 
Gephardt photo now shows him at 
a rally with a child in his arms. 
caption: "Save '!he Family Farm 
Bill." Under Gephardt, "Yes;" 
under Dukakis, "?" 
CUt to newspaper headline: 
"Dukakis to fanners. Grow blue-
berries, flowers, and Belgian 
endive. Washi.ngtcn Post, 
Feb. 15, 1987." 
cut back to photos. Gephardt 
shown talking to women. Under 
photo, "cut Taxes;" under Dukakis, 
"Raised Taxes." 
CUt to photo of Gephardt mingling 
with a crowd at a rally. 
cut to photo of Dukakis. 
caption: "Belgian Endive?" 
AUDIO 
Voice-over announcer: "canpare 
two candidates for President. 
"Dick Gephardt is fighting 
for a bill to save American 
jobs. Mike Dukakis is opposed 
to it. 
"Gephardt is for the family 
farm bill. Dukakis \<K)n' t take 
a stand. 
"He says our fanners have to 
diversify and grow blueberries, 
flowers and Belgian endive. 
"Gephardt fought to cut income 
taxes. Dukakis is one of the 
biggest tax raisers in Mas-
sachussetts history. 
"These are some of the reasons 
why southerners are for Gep 
hardt, not Dukakis. 
"Belgian Endive?" 
(Payne, 374-375) 
Gephardt beat Dukakis 44 percent to 31 in South Dakota--"a defeat virtually 
everyone in the Dukakis campaign was convinced could be traced to the failure 
to respond on 'Belgian Endive. "' (Germond, 278) 
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But Dukakis was to have his revenge on March 7, "Super Tuesday," the 
mega-prima.ry of 20 southern states. Gephardt suffered significant damage because 
of two negative Dukakis spots that aired allover the South. "List" ridiculed 
Gephardt's populist campaign slogan, "It's your fight, too," by showing a 
scrolling caption listing all the big corporations from whose political action 
canmittees Gephardt's campaign had accepted contributions. "Kind of makes you 
wonder," said the voice-over. "Is Dick Gephardt really fighting your fight--or 
theirs?" (Gennond, 284) 
According to Germond (284), "the comnercial credited with doing the rrost 
to undermine Gephardt distilled the case against him on inconsistency." The 
thirty-second spot, "Flip-Flops," showed an acrobat--a man in a suit whose 
hair had been spray-painted red to resemble Gephardt's --doing flips and jumping 
through hoops. 
VIDEO 
Acrobat as "Gephart" does 
forward and reverse flips 
across the screen. 
Captions: "The Gephardt record 
. • • Reagancmics • • • Minimum 
wage ••• Social Security 
• • • Corporate PAC rroney." 
Cut to Dukakis talking to voters. 
AUDIO 
Voice-over: "Congressman 
Dick Gephardt has flip-flopped 
on a lot of issues. He's 
been bJth for and against 
Reaganomics, for and against 
raising the minimum wage, for 
and against freezing Social 
Security benefits. Congressman 
Dick Gephardt acts tough toward 
big corporations but takes 
their PAC rroney." 
"Mike Dukakis refuses PAC rroney, 
opposes Reaganomics and supports 
a strong minimum wage and Social 
Securi ty. You know where Michael 
Dukakis stands." 
Cut back to acrobat doing flips. "But Congressman Dick Gephardt? 
Scene freezes him in mid-air. He's still up in the air." 
(Gennond, 284) 
Dukakis knocked off Gephardt with the ads. Commercials had become the 
prime sources of information that shaped opinion polls in the 1988 campaign. 
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"The only thing we really saw rrove the (poll) numbers was paid TV 
(advertisements)," Gephardt later said. "People didn't have a lot of infonnation 
alx)Ut any of us (candidates)." (Gennond, 284) 
Dukakis' SUper Tuesday victories put him well on the way toward the 
Democratic nomination, and he eventually finished off Jesse Jackson and Albert 
Gore in the North. Bush, meanwhile, had easily done in Ible on Super Tuesday, 
thus locking up the Republican nomination. 
In May, as the primaries were coming to an end, George Bush was not well 
liked and Michael Dukakis was largely unknown. According to Gallup and other 
polls, support for either candidate was a virtual tie, with many voters 
undecided. Relatively few voters had strong attachments to either candidate, 
l::mt twice as many of Dukakis' supporters felt strongly about their candidate 
(38 to 19 percent.) (Pamper, 125) 
Even before the conventions, Ailes and Atwater convinced Bush that the 
only way to beat Dukakis was to stage a negative campaign, as they had against 
Ible. It would be much easier for Bush to raise Dukakis' negative ratings than 
to lower his own. "If Bush could not pump himself up, he could at least tear 
Dukakis down." (Mathews, 100) This was to be Bush's strategy throughout the 
camp3.ign. 
Dukakis and his campaign workers were l::moyed by an NBC poll taken after 
the July Democratic Convention that had Dukakis leading by 17 points, 51 percent 
to Bush's 34. (Gerrrond, 359) Unlike the Bush camp, the Dukakis media campaign 
had no overall advertising strategy. (Devlin, 398) Although it was obvious 
that Bush would stage a negative camp3.ign, Dukakis resisted doing negative 
ads, thinking he could take the high road. For example, after the Democratic 
convention, his corrrnercials were all in a positive vein. "Dukakis was 
conditioned to a long race and thought that negative charges about his record 
-, 
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would subside or not be believed." (Devlin, 400) 
The task of Bush's media campaign was clear: it focused on criticizing 
Dukakis' liberalism while claiming the governor lacked patriotism. Dukakis' 
views on the Pledge of Allegiance and taxes, and his membership in the American 
Civil Liberties Union were fodder for Bush attacks on the stump. But the best 
weapons of the Bush campaign were negative TV ads. When Dukakis failed to answer 
their charges, they became even more potent. 
Bush commercials slashed Dukakis on three main issues: the environment, 
national defense and particularly crime--the latter because of a black convict 
named Willie Horton. (Devlin, 394) As is now well known, Gov. Dukakis had 
granted a prison furlough to Horton, a first-degree murderer. While on furlough, 
Horton went on a kidnapping and raping spree. Because of massive outrage in 
Massachusetts over the case, Dukakis put an end to the furlough program. But 
Horton would become Bush's most valuable player.(Barrett, 20) 
Bush's advisors deemed crime so important an issue that Dukakis was hit 
with it first through two ads, "Crime Quiz" and "Revolving Door." "Crime Quiz" 
showed a canplementary photo of Bush and a photo that, according to Devlin, 
"made Dukakis look like a sleaze." The announoer shot out a series of questions: 
"Who gave weekend passes to first-degree murderers who were not even eligible 
for p:lrole? . • • Who vetoed mandatory sentences for drug dealers? • Who 
opposes capital punishment in all cases and even vetoed the death penalty for 
cop killers?" The viewer did not have to guess which candidate, because an 
"oily-looking" picture of Dukakis zoomed to the forefront after each question, 
a la "Straddle." (Devlin, 394) 
The black-and-white 30-second ad "Revolving Door," which was filmed at 
the utah state prison, will probably go down in political history as the 




Dissonant sounds are heard: A guard with a rifle climbs the 
circular stairs of a prison watch-
tower. caption: "The Dukakis 
Furlough Program." 
a drum ••• ominous music 
••• metal stairs. Voice-over: 
liAs governor I Michael Dukakis 
vetoed mandatory sentences 
A guard with a gun walks along a 
barbed wire fence. 
A revolving door formed by bars 
rotates as men in prison clothes, 
some black and Hispanic, walk in 
and back out the door in a long 
line. caption: "268 Escaped." 
Closeup of the prisoners in slow 
motion revolving through the door. 
caption: "And Many Are still 
At Large. II 
Cut to a guard on a roof with a 
watchtower in the background. 
A small color picture of Bush 
appears. Small caption: "Paid 
for by Bush/Quayle 88." 
for drug dealers. 
"He vetoed the death penalty. 
"His revolving door prison 
policy gave weekend furloughs 
to first-degree murderers not 
eligible for parole. 
"While out, many corrrnitted 
other crimes like kidnapping 
and rape. 
"And many are still at large. 
"Now Michael Dukakis says he 
wants to do for America what 
hels done for Massachusetts. 
"America canlt afford that 
risk!" 
(Devlin, 389) 
"Revolving Door" was "the single most effective (ad), by the estimates 
of most professionals, and one whose impact probably could not be overstated." 
(Germond, 41 0) Democrats charged racism because the black and Hispanic 
"prisoners" in the line supposedly daninated the images. 
Later, independent groups supporting Bush aired several powerful TV ads 
on this issue, including one featuring the victims of Hortonls crime 
spree.(Panper, 86) Another showed a photo of the murderer himself, glaring 
out of the screen with the caption "Horton received 10 weekend passes fran 
prison. II 
The ads drew criticism for a lack of fairness: 
Most states have prisoner furlough programs, and murders have 
occurred as a result, including one in California during Ronald 
Reagan's tenns as governor and in the federal furlough program 
while Bush was vice president. Ironically, the crime rate 
dropped sharply in Massachusetts since 1982. (Pomper, 86) 
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And, controlling crime is not a major policy issue of the federal government--it 
is a responsibility mainly of state and local governments. 
If the Republican crime assault had stopped with pointing out the 
recklessness of the Massachusetts furlough policy which Dukakis once supported, 
then Demcx::rats and blacks v.uuld have no just cause for complaints. But, as 
Barrett noted, 
the Republican attack did not stop there. Instead, Bush's 
handlers tapped into the rich lode of white fear and resentment 
of blacks that the G.O.P. staked out more than 20 years ago, 
when the party of Lincoln recast itself as the embodiment 
of the white backlash. In Horton, Bush's staffers found a 
potent symbolic twofer: a means by which to appeal to the 
legitimate issue of crime while simultaneously stirring racial 
fears. (Barrett, 20) 
The crime ads caused a marked shift among "Reagan Demcx::rats, II people 
who identified themselves as Democrats but who had voted for Reagan in 
1980 and 1984. Dukakis had hoped to win among this group. But by enforcing 
Reagan Democrats' concerns about liberal crime policies, 
the ads forced Dukakis to react to Bush's initiatives rather 
than set his own agenda. The impact was quick to be felt in 
the polls •••• Gaming from a double-digit deficit in early 
August, Bush had pulled ahead of Dukakis by the end of the 
month. For the first time in the campaign, more people had 
a favorable than unfavorable opinion of George Bush. (Pomper , 
87) 
On the environment issue, Ailes scored a hit for Bush against Dukakis 
with the 30-second "Harbor" ad. Filmed in garish color, "Harbor" depicted the 
Boston harbor oozing with sewer pipes, floating debris, and garbage washing 
up on the shore. The voice-over began, liAs a candidate, Michael Dukakis called 
Boston Harbor an open sewer. As governor, he had the opportunity to do something 
about it, but chose not to." (Devlin, 395) 
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When it came to an attacking Dukakis on national defense, Bush was 
presented with a freebie. At a defense plant in Michigan, Dukakis' photo 
opportunity turned into a debacle when the Democrat donned a crash helmet and 
rode in an M-1 tank. The governor looked ridiculous, and Ailes and Atwater 
jumped at the chance to use footage of the stunt in an ad: 
VIDED 
Dukakis riding around in 
tank, smiling and waving. 
caption identical to the 
narration crawls up the screen. 
Close-up and freeze of Dukakis 
smiling into the camera. 
AUDIO 
VO: "Michael Dukakis has owosed 
virtually every defense system 
we developed. He opposed new 
aircraft carriers. He opposed 
antisatellite weapons. He opposed 
four missile systems, including 
the Pershing TWo Missile 
deployment. Dukakis opposed the 
Stealth bomber and a ground 
emergency warning system against 
nuclear attack. He even criticized 
our rescue mission to Grenada 
and our strike against Libya. 
And now he wants to be our 
Cbmmander-in-Chief. America can't 
afford that risk." 
(Gennond, 411) 
The summary of Dukakis's position on defense priorities was, 
unsurprisingly, a clever distortion and misrepresentation. Dukakis had, for 
example, supported the Stealth bomber throughout the campaign. (Devlin, 396) 
But the mere picture of Dukakis looking like Beetle Bailey in the tank was 
itself devastating. (Germond, 411) 
Reporters covered Dukakis complaining that the "Tank" ad was unfair, but 
then the net\\Drk news programs replayed the corrmercial, giving it rrore 
credibility. ĜŸHĚ27) 
By Labor Day, George Bush had succeeded in getting people to like him 
and not to like Michael Dukakis. The Democratic candidate, still largely an 
unknown to two out of five voters, had as many voters disliking him as liking 
him. (Pomper, 127) 
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If Dukakis had learned anything fram his negative ad battle with Gephardt, 
he didn't show it in the struggle against Bush. Dukakis' ad campaign was wracked 
with problems: 
--His media staff was disarray. There was no Ailes or Atwater at the helm 
to deflect Bush's charges, much less define Bush negatively. Dukakis staffers 
reported to a "hydra-headed" operation that was slow to give orders. Dukakis' 
top personnel went through drastic changes in three months, with same advisers 
being fired soon after they were hired. (Devlin, 397) The confusion resulted 
in foolish decisions, like putting the governor in a tank. 
--Dukakis did not like negative ads, and it was hard to get his approval 
to do a negative ad. He personally scuttled or made changes in several 
potentially effective commercials. 
--The ads that were made were produced quickly and poorly. Several featured 
dull word crawls with no pictures. Devlin called them "canmercials for the 
deaf •••• (Dukakis' ad people) thought television was an electronic 
newspaper." (Devlin, 398-399) 
--There was difficulty in making the negative ads stick. Because the vice 
presidency is perceived as being a powerless office, Bush had a certain 
invulnerability to the criticisms of the Reagan administration. (Devlin, 399) 
By comparison to the Bush ads, Dukakis' corrmercials had less distortion, 
but they were ineffective in getting his message across. For example, in the 
crucial period of late September, what was produced and shown consisted of 
five ads in a "packaging" series--ads depicting George Bush's handlers cynically 
plotting strategy. (Devlin, 400) 
In a spot called "Funny," actors appearing to be Bush 
advertising people are brainstorming a new spot promoting 
Bush as "a strong, experienced leader," as members of the 
group caustically note what are intended to reflect conflicts 
with that notion: "He was head of the task force on drugs," 
says one. "And drug traffic goes up 400 percent," says another. 
"Very amusing," says a third, obviously troubled. "They're 
trying to sell you a p3.ckage," says a voice-over at the close. 
"Wouldn't you rather choose a president?" It was not clear 
the message of cynicism came through; the message was 
criticized by same as leaving viewers confused as to which 
camp was running the spot. (Broadcasting, 29) 
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The "packaging" series tried to subtly respond to Bush's attacks, both p3.st 
and future, "but the ads were too much 'inside baseball' for casual 
viewer-voters to grasp." (Gennond, 411) 
A far superior Dukakis ad was "OVal Office," which criticized Bush's 
controversial selection of Indiana Sen. Dan Quayle as his running mate. 
VIDED 
A picture of the OVal Office 
appears with no one in it. 
New York TilIEs headline: 
"President Roosevelt Dead" 
while Harry Truman takes the 
oath of office. Zoom in on 
desk and chair. Headline: 
"Kennedy Is Killed by Sniper" 
as Lyndon Johnson is pictured 
taking his oath. 
Zoom-in closer on the empty 
desk and chair. Headline: 
"Nixon Resigns" as Gerald Ford 
is pictured taking his oath. 
Zoom-in on empty chair. 
Close-up of chair. 
caption: "Hopefully we will 
never know how great a lapse 
of judgment that really was." 
Picture fades to black, but 
caption remains. 
AUDIO 
'The beat of a heart is heard. 
vo: "The rrost powerful man in 
the \'K)r ld is also rrortal. 
"We know this all to well in 
America. 
One in five American Vice 
Presidents have had to rise to 
the duties of Commander in Chief. 
"One in five have had to take 
on the responsibilities of the 
most powerful office in the \'K)rld. 
"For this job, after five months 
of reflection, George Bush made 
his personal choice--J. Danforth 
Quayle. 
"Hopefully, we will never know 
how great a lapse of judgment 
that really was." 
(Devlin, 390) 
Unfortunately for Dukakis, "OVal Office" was too little, too late. ''vice 
presidential candidates rarely have much effect on the presidential vote," 
writes Pcrnper. 
It was relatively easy to raise people's doubts about Dan 
Quayle. It was much harder to convince prospective Bush 
supporters that because of Quayle's inadequacies, they ought 
to switch to Dukakis. • • • Quayle's weakness offered Bush 
an odd advantage. Quayle made Bush look strong (by comparison) • 
• • • Quayle was George Bush's George Bush. (Pomper, 93) 
17 
other potentially helpful Dukakis ads, even the less negative ones, never 
made it to the screen. "Jirmny" showed a young man working in a pizza parlor, 
flipping dough. 'The voice-over explains that "Jirnny got accepted to college, 
but his family couldn't afford tuition." The announcer mentions Republican 
freezes in federal financial aid. Dukakis then appears onscreen as the voice 
says "Mike Dukakis wants to help. If a kid like Jirmny has the grades for 
college, America should find a way to send him ." 'The ad was supposed to 
receive major air time on NBC during the Olympics, but it didn't. "The 
leadership vacuum and bureaucratic folly of the Dukakis advertising effort 
all but guaranteed such mistakes. A well-organized and well-thought-out effort 
might have helped.' (Diamond, 1989, 385) 
Some of the Dukakis spots, such as "OVal Office," were individually 
"canpetent," but they didn't add up to a coherent whole. According to Diamond 
(1989, 385), "They were isolated, unrelated to what the candidate was saying 
at news events •••• Not surprisingly, Dukakis' advertising did little to 
stop the candidate's post-convention slide, much less rrove him forward." 
By the beginning of October, Bush's verbal assaults on Dukakis hit their 
mark: Dukakis' negative ratings slipped to an eight percent deficit, while 
10 percent rrore of the people surveyed found Bush favorable than unfavorable. 
(Pomper, 127) 
Pomper noted that one reason the Bush campaign stayed with the negative 
appeals was that "after many months of work, George Bush was still not 
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considered a strong enough candidate to win on his own, with positive images." 
Another, quite simply, was that the negative campaigning kept 'VX:>rking. "By 
late October, even Jesse Jackson's approval ratings ŸŲŤĚhigher than Dukakis'" 
Even more significantly, the proportion of respondents saying that George Bush 
was "tough enough" on crime and criminals rose from 23 percent in July to a 
full 61 percent in late October, while the proportion saying Dukakis was not 
tough enough rose from 36 percent to 49 percent. "It 'VX:>uld be hard to find 
more convincing proof of the efficacy of attack politics. The campaign did 
make a difference." (Pomper 95-96) 
But Dukakis and his staff failed to see how well the Bush ad's symbolic 
themes resonated with Reagan DEmocrats. On the furlough issue, "Dukakis allowed 
himself to be defined as the kind of liberal who 'VX:>uld use the legal system 
to protect aberrant behavior, rather than stamp it out." (Pomper, 86) 
By the end of the campaign, Bush's furlough tactic had 'VX:>rked. One in 
every four voters was able to identify Willie Horton as a black convict who 
raped a white woman while on a ŸÛŤŪTĚfurlough from a Massachusetts prison. 
(Diamond, 1989, 386) Four days before the election, Bush was liked by about 
half the electorate (46 percent) and disliked by only a third. What Dukakis 
faced as election day approached was just the apposite: a third of the 
electorate liked him, but 41 percent disliked him. (Pomper, 128) 
The night before the election, both Dukakis and Bush broadcast 30 minute 
messages during prime time. These ŸŲŤĚpositive, almost sappy, fulfilling the 
fourth or resolution stage of Diamond's advertising chronology. 
On election night, November 8, the returns gave Bush 53.9 percent of the 
popular vote to 46.1 for Dukakis. Bush had won 40 states, Dukakis only ten 
plus the District of Columbia. Bush 'VX:>n 426 electoral votes, Dukakis only 11 2. 
( GeIJIlOnd, 455) 
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A post-election Gallup poll of 2,325 voters for the Times Mirror Oompany, 
publisher of the IDs Angeles Times and other newspapers, concluded that the 
assault on Dukakis had been responsible for Bush's victory. "We find the success 
of the Bush campaign was based on making liberalism, the pledge of allegiance 
and the prison-furlough controversy salient, while at the same time making 
Bush vulnerabilities of less relative importance," the Gallup Organization 
reported. (Germond, 467) 
The election provided two final ironies: For all his rhetoric about 
"competence," Dukakis and his advertising staff were incanpetent to run a 
presidential ad campaign. And although criticized for selecting Dan Quayle 
as his running mate, Bush had the judgment to hire Roger Ailes, Lee Atwater 
and an advertising staff that was arguably the best in the business. 
In the aftermath of the 1988 election, political scientists had several 
concerns about future campaigns. First was the ŸŲŲXĚthat too much emphasis 
was placed upon television commercials. Of the $54.4 million in federal funds 
that each candidate and his party received, Bush spent $35 million on television 
advertising and Dukakis $30 million--hefty sums, to be sure. Out of his 
advertising money, Bush spent $31.5 million to buy television time. Dukakis, 
however, used $23.5 million for time-buying, and he spent far more on production 
costs than did Bush. (Devlin, 391) 
Television advertising has driven up the cost of running for office. From 
1912 to 1952, each national party spent about the same amount of money per 
vote cast in national elections. Then, with the introduction of television, 
campaign expenditures skyrocketed. (Diamond, 1989, 387) 
By 1968, the Republican and Democratic corrmittees were spending 
three times as much per vote as they had 1 6 years earlier. 
Moreover, the share of spending going to television has 
increased at an even faster rate--and at the expense of other 
campaign methods. 'Ibtal political spending (adjusted for 
inflation) has tripled since 1952, while the amount spent 
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on TV has increased at least fivefold. (Diamond, 1989, 387) 
Perhaps the larger question is, why is there so much negative advertising 
in presidential campaigns? "For the same reason there is so much crime: it 
pays, and rrost of it goes unpunished, II says George Will. 
Negative advertising works, and because it does, it provokes 
reprisals. An attacked candidate cannot spend a lot of time 
answering accusations. Play defense, you lose. And negative 
ads are cost-efficient • • • . It is quicker to gain political 
ground by mugging the other person than by praising yourself. 
(Will, 1989, 92) 
The 1988 campaign was only the rrost conspicuous, extended example of the 
effectiveness of negative ads. In off-year elections since then, the trend 
toward negativity has continued. In New Jersey's 1989 gubernatorial race, 
Democrat James J. Florio started the negative blitz by suggesting that his 
opponent Jim Courter was hostile to the environment--all because leaking drums 
of heating oil were found on Courter's property. Courter replied with an ad 
that charge that Florio was a member of the mafia--based on a contribution 
Florio received frcm a union that was later found to be corrupt. Each candidate 
ran an ad showing his opponent with Pinocchio's nose. (Florio won.) (Will, 
1989, 92) 
In the 1990 Texas gubernatorial race, advertising was especially nasty 
in the Democratic primary. Jim Mattox ran an ad claiming--without attribution-
-that his opponent, Ann Richards, had been addicted to cocaine. Richards turned 
the tables with an ad showing a cartoon caricature of Mattox throwing mud onto 
a photo of Richards. The mud was magically repelled and flew back onto "Mattox, II 
while a voice-over explained that Mattox refused to make public his income 
tax returns. By attacking not only the opponent but also his negative strategy, 
Richards was able to win the primary. (Richards' spot was ironically similar 
to the "Funny" ad Dukakis had used to attack Bush. The difference was that 
Dukakis' cornrrercial was too subtle, while Richards' ad wasn't subtle at all.) 
--
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Let's assume that we will experience a continuing invasion of negative ads 
that are flashier, glitzier and even more mean-spirited. How will this affect 
future ŤŨŤȘWÙŬŪVŸĞĚCertainly, negative ads will be used widely in the 1990 
Congressional and state races, and will be a deciding factor in some of them. 
As for the 1992 presidential election, expect the eventual Democratic nominee 
to defeat his prirrary opponents with the help of negative ads. Mindful of the 
lost opportunity in 1988, Democrats will flood viewers with corrmercials attacking 
George Bush. With his built-in advantage as a popular incumbent, Bush won't 
necessarily need to use negative ads--but he will. Ailes and Atwater will again 
provide their services, to create anti-Democrat ads that are even more negative. 
Some will undoubtedly wonder if all this is such a bad thing. After all, 
"mudslinging" is a tradition in American politics that dates back to Andrew 
Jackson, if not earlier. Aren't negative ads just the modern rranifestations of 
that tradition? 
The problem inherent in today' s negative ads is that they consume an 
excessively large amount of our political debate and erode the democratic process. 
Negative ads force us to dwell on sometimes shallow, trivial issues. They also 
cause us to respond viscerally rather than rationally. Certainly the issue of 
prison furloughs is not trivial; but in widespread feelings of outrage about the 
Massachusetts case, no one questioned a similar furlough program in the federal 
prisons. 
'The cost of negative ads is apathy, lowered voter turnout and an avoidance 
of real issues facing the country, such as children, poverty, the federal deficit 
and a decaying infrastructure. "A tightening downward gyre has begun: as more 
politicians campaign negatively, more voters become cynical and increasingly 
resistant to posi ti ve campaigning, ready to believe bad news about everyone." 
(Will, 1989, 92) 
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What can be done about attack ads? First, it must be recognized that negative 
ads gain more credibility through network news coverage, which this thesis has 
not attempted to analyze. If the attacked candidate canplains that his opponent's 
commercial is unfair, and the networks replay the ad without questioning its 
claims, then the ad's message is confirmed in the minds of many viewers. Reporters 
should treat commercials as speeches, and debunk farfetched claims and distortions. 
If candidate X said that candidate Y favored a cut in Social Security benefits, 
then reporters would certainly check the truth of the statement. That standard 
should be applied to candidate XiS commercial which makes the same claim. 
Negative ads could also be curtailed if Congress were to pass a bill proposed 
by two senators, John Danforth, R-Missouri, and Ernest Hollings, D-Arkansas. It 
would require that candidates who want to run ads mentioning (which invariably 
means attacking) their opponents must do so in person, on camera, instead of 
relying on the voice-over of a disembodied announcer, faking deadly seriousness. 
"If candidates want to sling mud • • • the voters should be able to see the 
candidates' dirty hands." (Will, 1989, 92) 
But until there is reform, there will be only the new, unwritten rule to 
govern future presidential elections: The candidate who takes the offensive and 
broadcasts the more vicious commercial, who better spreads deceptions and 
half-truths, will win. This was proven in 1988, when two uninspiring candidates 
with no burning big issues to confront them needed all the help they could get 
from television commercials to win. The election was a demonstration of what strong 
negative ads with good planning and execution can do, canpared to the opposite. 
(Devlin, 412) 
The hoary debate among political scientists about whether 
this is any way to choose a leader has long since been mooted. 
The strategic campaign question is now: Which side is doing 
the better job of producing telegenic images? In November 
1988, 54 percent of the voting public gave its answer. 
(Diamond, 1989, 388) 
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A great many factors influence a presidential election: the record of 
the incumbent administration, news coverage of the campaign in print and on 
television, debates between candidates, even the weather on Election Day. But 
it is disturbing that the same format which sells detergent--the television 
ȘŬŲÜŪNŸŲȘÙŠŨĤĤŠŨVŬĚsells presidents. Only once each four years does the nation 
express its collective will. If that decision is made on the basis of a 30-
second ad, then the vitality of our democratic system could be weakened beyond 
repair. 
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